Commentary to Professor Hafner by Tahvanainen, Annika
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 25 Issue 4 
2004 
Commentary to Professor Hafner 
Annika Tahvanainen 
Åbo Akademi University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Annika Tahvanainen, Commentary to Professor Hafner, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 865 (2004). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol25/iss4/3 
 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal 
of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COMMENT
COMMENTARY TO PROFESSOR HAFNER
This Comment is a response to Professor Hafner's presentation in
which he considered fragmentation as an unavoidable consequence of
the increasing number of norms and judicial mechanisms, as well as of
the regionalization of international law and the weakening of the state
system.
Human rights law is frequently identified as potentially increasing
the fragmentation of international law.' While human rights law is and
will remain part of international law, it has some unique characteristics
and has been considered to form a distinct sub-discipline. Furthermore,
certain human rights treaties, with their institutionalized complaint
mechanisms, constitute self-contained regimes
Human rights law is also a prime example of an area of international
law where the weakening of the state system is clearly visible. This is
evidenced already by the non-reciprocal character of human right norms
themselves, ° and by the discernable development away from the volun-
tarist conception of international law, e.g. in the area of reservations to
human rights treaties.
Despite this, it is argued in this Comment that, on a conceptual and
normative level, human rights can and do contribute to the constitutionali-
zation of international law, reflecting a nucleus of norms essential for
assuring co-existence of and co-operation among different international
actors, as well as the protection of the fundamental values and interests
which are common to the international community as a whole.'
1. See Matthew Craven, Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights
Treaty in International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 489, 490 (2000).
2. Id.
3. On self-contained regimes, see, e.g., Bruno Simma, Self-contained Regimes, 16
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 111 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 640, 646 (1996)
(separate opinion of Judge Weeranantry) (expressing Judge Weeramantry's view that the
Genocide Convention, like any "human rights and humanitarian treaties do not represent an
exchange of interests and benefits between contracting States in the conventional sense....
Human rights and humanitarian treaties represent, rather, a commitment of the participating
States to certain norms and values recognized by the international community.").
5. See MARLIES GALENKAMP, INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVISM; THE CONCEPT
OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 97 (1998) ("... [T]he international community [is] an entirety whose
interests may not necessarily be the same as those of individual states, and has thereby some
rights and responsibilities of its own."). The increase of subjects of international law has
meant that reference is now made to the "international community as a whole" instead of "the
international community of states" known from Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Ch. IV.E.1, at 54, U.N. Doc.
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There is, indeed, a growing appreciation that the development of
human rights norms and associated processes must necessarily be
reflected in the forms and structures of international law. Recent case law
of the European Court of Human Rights stresses the interdependence of
human rights norms and other norms of international law.6 This has been
interpreted as a recognition by the court that international law forms
a unified system,7 which should, in its entirety, aim at improving
the protection of human rights.8 In this regard, fragmentation and
constitutionalization-two concepts that though seemingly opposite-are
not necessarily mutually exclusive.
The notion that the protection of certain norms are the concern of the
international community as a whole can be considered a constituent
A/56/10 (2001) (Article 42(b) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, referring to obligations owed to "a group of States including that State, or
the international community as a whole.").
6. In the case of Al Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79 (2001), the
Court stated that
[t]he Convention, including Article 6, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The Court
must be mindful of the Convention's special character as a human rights treaty, and
it must also take the relevant rules of international law into account.... The Con-
vention should as far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of
international law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of
State immunity.
Id. at 100. See also Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157 (2001) (the rele-
vant paragraph 35 is omitted in the official report but is available at http://
www.ehcr.coe.int/eng).
7. It is a debated, and most of all dependent on how one defines a legal system,
whether one can consider international law to constitute a system or merely an assortment of
independent regimes. Hafner has argued that
[i]t can ... easily be assumed that, presently, there exists no homogenous system of
international law. As it has been noted at several occasions even during recent dis-
cussions in the International Law Commission, inter alia on State responsibility,
existing international law does not consist of one homogenous legal order, but
mostly of different partial systems, producing an "unorganized system."
Gerhard Hafner, Risks Ensuing From Fragmentation of International Law, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-second Session, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 321, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000). But see YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPET-
ING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 87-93 (2003). Shany defines
a 'system' as: "(1) a set of elements; (2) arranged in an order (characterized by the interaction
between the different elements); and (3) possessing a certain degree of unity or cohesion
(which facilitates the description of the elements as parts of a bigger whole)." Id. at 87. Shany
concludes that, as a consequence of the interactions in international law between norms and
between norms and institutions (institutions related to each other by a common set of norms),
international law as a whole could satisfy the minimum requirements of a legal system and
should be regarded as a legal system despite the ad hoc nature some legal institutions and the
poor levels of coherence between institutions of international law. See id. at 94.
8. See JUKKA VILJANEN, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A DEVELOPER
OF THE GENERAL DOCTRINES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 81 (2003).
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element of the constitutinalization of international law, contributing to the
development of a more objective international legal order.9 It is also the
element that connects human rights to the concepts of erga omnes
obligations and jus cogens norms under international law-two concepts
that have been considered not only to contribute to the
constitutionalization of international law but also to a hierarchy of norms
in international law. While the hierarchy of norms in international law is
unsettled, and the idea of a hierarchy among human rights norms would
contradict with the prevailing indivisibility and interdependence approach
in human rights law, one may argue that, based on the connections among
human rights (especially non-derogable rights), erga omnes obligations,
and jus cogens norms, it should be possible to identify a core of
fundamental rules and principles based on values that are common to the
international community as a whole. The fact that few would deny that a
hierarchy of normative values has already crystallized' should also
inform us of which values are more or less important on the normative
hierarchical scale.
While little progress has taken place in the clarification of the con-
cepts of erga omnes obligations and jus cogens norms in international
law, it is argued that progress in this respect could take place through the
jurisprudence that has been developed by human rights treaty monitoring
bodies, especially concerning non-derogable rights (pertaining only to
human rights), most of which qualify as jus cogens norms giving rise to
erga omnes obligations (both pertaining to human rights law and interna-
tional law). With the increased co-operation, information sharing, and
cross-referencing by such international and regional bodies, one would
assume that it would be possible to identify the core common values in
the area of human rights law. Through the interdependence of norms and
through concepts that are common to both human rights and interna-
tional law, i.e. jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations, not only
9. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 270-71
(July 8) (declaration of President Bedjaoui) ("Despite the still modest breakthrough of 'supra-
nationalism', the progress made in terms of the institutionalization, not to say integration and
'globalisation', of international society is undeniable. Witness the proliferation of international
organizations, the gradual substitution of an international law of co-operation for the tradi-
tional law of co-existence, the emergence of the concept of 'international community' and its
sometimes successful attempts at subjectivization. A token of all these developments is the
place which international law now accords to concepts such as obligations erga omnes, rules
of jus cogens, or the common heritage of mankind. The resolutely positivist, voluntarist ap-
proach of international law still current at the beginning of the [twentieth] century ... has
been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a law more readily seeking to
reflect a collective conscience and respond to the social necessities of states organized as a
community.").
10. See Andrea Bianchi, Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 263, 268-
69 (2002).
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would human rights law have greater degree of constitutionalization, but
that would apply to international law as a whole.
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